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LAW REVIEW ARTICLES THAT
BACKFIRE
Gerald L. Neuman*

Other articles in this Symposium have chronicled the realworld triumphs of legal scholarship. I have sadder tales to tell. I
would like to discuss law review articles that have had an apparent influence on the course of legal development, but not in the
manner that the author intended.
Many of the readers of this Symposium may have their favorite examples of this phenomenon. 1 Such misfortunes can befall
anyone; both of the instances I will describe involve a highly
respected constitutional scholar, Professor Henry Paul
Monaghan of Columbia Law School. They illustrate two mechanisms by which good scholarship can lead to bad law. In the first
instance, one of Professor Monaghan's proposed reinterpretations of a troubling Supreme Court decision inspired an even
more troubling line of cases. In the second, the Supreme Court
adopted a theoretical approach that Monaghan had advocated,
but in an oversimplified form that yielded results far different
from those he recommended.
I.

FIRST CAUTIONARY TALE: FROM PAUL TO PARRATT

Of "Liberty" and "Property''2 is Monaghan's midterm evaluation of the Burger Court's sacrifice of traditional constitutional
understandings in order to cut back on the section 1983 litiga* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. A.B., Harvard
College, 1973; Ph.D., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1977; J.D., Harvard Law
School, 1980.
This article is dedicated to Drucilla Cornell. I also owe thanks for helpful comments
and suggestions to a number of other colleagues, especially Stephen Burbank, Michael
Fitts, Frank Goodman, Seth Kreimer, Charles Mooney, Susan Sturm, Clyde Summers,
and Alan Watson. And I would never get anything done without the help of Mrs. Margaret Ulrich.
1. The example most commonly suggested by my colleagues is the collected writings
of Judge Robert Bork.
2. Monaghan, Of "Liberty" and "Property," 62 CORNELL L. REv. 405 (1977).
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tion explosion. 3 The portion of this article of interest to us here
is Part I on "Liberty,"' Monaghan's shocked response to Justice
Rehnquist's expulsion of reputation from the sphere of constitutionally protected liberty in Paul v. Davis.~
Davis was a news photographer allegedly defamed by unjustified inclusion in a police chief's broadside identifying "active
shoplifters." He sued under section 1983 instead of bringing a
state law defamation action. In his opinion for the Court disposing of this claim, Justice Rehnquist expressed fear that permitting the section 1983 action to proceed would make every tort
committed by the state a constitutional violation. One of Justice
Rehnquist's techniques for avoidip.g this result was to hold that
the defamation did not result in a deprivation of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law because the reputational interest standing alone was not a form of liberty or property protected by the due process clause. Monaghan, like other scholars, 6
was disturbed by two related aspects of Paul v. Davis: the dismissal of the deeply grounded common-law interest in security
of reputation from the purview of the due process clause and
Justice Rehnquist's relentless distortion of precedents that stood
in the way of his analysis. 7
In Of "Liberty" and "Property," Monaghan urged that Paul
v. Davis be sharply limited, or even overruled, a step he did not
lightly recommend. 8 Justice Rehnquist's analysis was too inconsistent with traditional and appropriate constitutional understandings. Less brutal methods could keep the floodgates closed.
3. That is, litigation brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). Since the Supreme
Court's awakening of § 1983 from dormancy in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961),
litigation under that section has grown to a significant portion of the federal docket. The
dimensions of this growth, its causes, and whether it continues to deserve the label "explosion" are disputed issues. See, e.g., Eisenberg, Section 1983: Doctrinal Foundations
and an Empirical Study, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 482, 522-23 (1982); Eisenberg & Schwab,
The Reality of Constitutional Tort Litigation, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 641, 642-49, 658-71
(1987); Turner, When Prisoners Sue: A Study of Prisoner Section 1983 Suits in the
Federal Courts, 92 HARV. L. REv. 610, 611-12 (1979).
4. Monaghan, supra note 2, at 411-34.
5. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
6. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 701-03 (2d ed. 1988); Shapiro,
Mr. Justice Rehnquist: A Preliminary View, 90 HARV. L. REV. 293, 325-28 (1976);
Tushnet, The Constitutional Right to One's Good Name: An Examination of the Scholarship of Mr. Justice Rehnquist, 64 KY. L.J. 753 passim (1976).
7. Monaghan, supra note 2, at 423-29. Monaghan's indignation was unmistakable:
"The Court's re-rationalization of the earlier cases is wholly startling to anyone familiar
with those precedents. In many ways I find this aspect Paul's most disturbing. Fair
treatment by the Court of its own precedents is an indispensable condition of judicial
legitimacy." Id: at 424.
8. Id. at 432.
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For starters, the Court might have narrowed the range of section
1983 litigation by reading section 1983 less broadly than the
Constitution. 9 But even if the Court insisted on tampering with
the due process clause rather than with the statute, it did not
need to deny that "liberty" includes reputation. Monaghan identified three points at which Davis's claim that the state had deprived him of liberty without due process of law could have been
attacked.
The first was Justice Rehnquist's chosen target: the forms of
liberty protected by the due process clause could be restricted.
Monaghan found this retrenchment inconsistent with a long tradition of viewing fourteenth amendment liberty as "an idea embracing all the interests in personal security (including freedom
from defamation), which had been protected from private interference by the common-law courts." 10 He further found this approach "wholly at odds with our ethical, political, and constitutional assumption[s] about the worth of each individual." 11
Second, Monaghan observed that the police chiefs circulation
of the flyer might not have deprived Davis of reputation. The
fourteenth amendment protects against abuse of government
power. But not every government action that invades a liberty or
property interest neces_sarily rises to the level of a "deprivation."
Monaghan noted, for example, that "ordinarily, negligent conduct by the state would implicate liberty or property interests
but would not ... constitute a deprivation of these interests." 12
This was the solution Monaghan advocated. It left him unimpressed with Justice Rehnquist's expressed fear that recognizing
reputation as liberty would make every defamation a constitutional violation and would convert the fourteenth amendment
into "a font of tort law to be superimposed upon whatever systems may already be administered by the States." 13 Indeed, a
decade later, after initially holding to the contrary, the Court
per Justice Rehnquist adopted precisely this solution in Daniels
v. Williams 1' and Davidson v. Cannon. 111 Justice Rehnquist did
9. Id. at 429-30. This would, however, require overruling a long line of cases beginning with Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), holding that civil actions may be brought
under § 1983 for all fourteenth amendment violations, regardless of the existence of
state remedies.
10. Id. at 423.
11. Id. at 427.
12. Id. at 428.
13. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976); see Monaghan, supra note 2, at 427-28,
432-34.
14. 474 U.S. 327 (1986).
15. 474 U.S. 344 (1986).
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not, however, credit Of "Liberty" and "Property." One can only
speculate as to how much influence Monaghan's article had in
this respect.
Of more immediate importance was a third point of attack
that Monaghan identified in passing. 16 Even if Davis had been
deprived of liberty, the deprivation might not have been without
due process of law. Davis's claim rested on the due process explosion and its "much criticized insistence upon adversary proceedings, absent exigent circumstances, before governmental actions adversely affecting individual interests occur." 17 The Court
could have concluded that Davis had been afforded due process
of law because the police department's ex parte "procedures"
and the availability of a subsequent tort action for defamation
provided sufficient protection. Moreover, said Monaghan:
[P]rior hearings might well be dispensed with in many
circumstances in which the state's conduct, if not adequately justified, would constitute a common-law tort.
This would leave the injured plaintiff in precisely the
same posture as a common-law plaintiff, and this procedural consequence would be quite harmonious with the
substantive view that the fourteenth amendment encompasses the same liberties as those protected by the common law. 18
This is the passage whose influence I shall trace. In its context
(an important qualification), it addresses the timing of a due
process hearing and suggests that a common-law tort action may
often provide a sufficient, though later, vehicle for assessing the
justifiability of the state's interference with the plaintiff's property or liberty interest. The ambiguous, aesthetic observation
about the "harmoniousness" of this approach does not imply
that the common-law remedy is by definition the only constitutionally required "process" for an interest with a common-law
pedigree. Monaghan also made clear that his proposal extended
only to procedural, and not to substantive, due process. 19
Monaghan took no notice of a fourth point of attack: that Davis might not have been deprived of liberty by the state. The
argument would be that although the police chief, a state em16. Monaghan, supra note 2, at 431 ("I do not pursue these inquiries here because
they are wide of my primary concern.").
17. Id. at 430-31 (emphasis in original).
18. Id. at 431.
19. Id. at 432.
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ployee, had infringed Davis's reputational interest, he had nonetheless done so on his own, in violation of state tort law. The
state itself arguably stood ready to repudiate its employee's action by offering redress in a defamation suit. The initial defamation was "state action" in a sense; but the state action was not
yet "complete," because the state had not yet acted through its
officially established procedures. Only if the state denied Davis a
means of redress would it deprive him of liberty without due
process of law. Essentially, this argument had been made by a
Seventh Circuit judge before Paul v. Davis was decided, in a section 1983 action brought by a prisoner against prison officials
who had negligently left his cell door open after a search,
thereby permitting persons unknown to steal his personal property. 2,0 The judge was named John Paul Stevens, and the case
was titled Bonner v. Coughlin; 21 after Judge Stevens's elevation
to the Supreme Court, the Seventh Circuit sitting en bane affirmed his decision on alternative grounds, including a reliance
on Paul v. Davis. 22
Although both this fourth, state-action-based approach and
the third, due-process-based approach treat the tort action as
satisfying the state's obligation to provide due process, the difference between them is profound. The due-process-based approach involves a case-by-case assessment of whether procedural
due process values are adequately served by postponing the individual's opportunity for a hearing until after the initial state action that deprives her of liberty or property. This assessment
could rest on a cost-benefit analysis of the Mathews v. Eldridge
sort23 or could employ other doctrinal or theoretical perspectives. The state-action-based approach, on the other hand, de20. Bonner v. Coughlin, 517 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir. 1975), modified en bane, 545 F.2d
565 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 932 (1978).
It seems to us that there is an important difference between a challenge to an
established state procedure as lacking in due process and a property damage
claim arising out of the misconduct of state officers. In the former situation the
facts satisfy the most literal reading of the Fourteenth Amendment's prohibition
against "State" deprivations of property; in the latter situation, however, even
though there is action "under color or' state law sufficient to bring the amendment into play, the state action is not necessarily complete.
Id. at 1319.
21. 517 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir. 1975), modified en bane, 545 F.2d 565 (7th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 435 U.S. 932 (1978).
22. 545 F.2d 565, 566-67 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 932 (1978).
23. 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976) (listing three relevant factors: 1) the private interest
at stake; 2) the risk of erroneous deprivation of this interest and the value of additional
procedures; and 3) the government's interest). See generally J. MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN
THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE (1985).
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nies that the state has finally acted because the remedial avenue
remains open. Nothing in its logic is limited to the procedural
due process context. Most importantly, this approach reverses
well-settled understandings regarding what constitutes "state
action" under the fourteenth amendment; 2 " indeed, the reversal
is so extreme that it is perhaps not surprising that Monaghan
overlooked this tactic.
Of "Liberty" and "Property" appeared in the March 1977 issue of the Cornell Law Review. It had an immediate effect. In
. April 1977, Justice Powell quoted the passage that appears
above 211 in support of his holding in Ingraham v. Wright 26 that
due process did not require a prior hearing before the imposition
of corporal punishment in the Florida public schools. Justice
Powell reaffirmed the view that constitutional "liberty" embraced the common-law rights of personal security. 27 But he also
noted the historical basis for an exception covering "moderate
correction"28 and found that Florida law preserved both the
traditional common-law tort remedy and the exception. 29 By intertwined avenues of doctrinal reasoning and cost-benefit analysis, Justice Powell found the tort action adequate to protect the
schoolchildren's interest in avoiding unjustified intrusions on
their physical security. 30
At this point in the decision, Justice Powell's reasoning became remarkable in a number of respects. First, his doctrinal
analysis cited in one breath both Monaghan's approach and the
Stevens opinion in Bonner v. Coughlin-betraying no awareness
of any difference between them. 31 Second, Justice Powell was
writing in a mode, not uncommon for him, that tended to equate
due process with tradition. 32 He invoked Monaghan's article as if
24. See infra text accompanying note 45.
25. See supra text accompanying note 18.
26. 430 U.S. 651, 679 n.47 (1977).
27. Id. at 672-74; cf. Monaghan, supra note 2, at 413-14 (discussing the transformation of common-law rights into liberties protected from governmental interference).
28. See 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *120 (stating that "battery is, in some
caaes, justifiable or lawful; as where one who hath authority, a parent or master, gives
moderate correction to his child, his scholar, or his apprentice").
29. 430 U.S. at 676-77.
30. Id. at 678-82.
31. Id. at 679 n.47. The citation to Bonner v. Coughlin did not win Justice Stevens's
vote; he both joined a dissent written by Justice White and added a brief opinion of his
own speculating that the majority's analysis, though unacceptable in the context of corporal punishment, could apply to certain deprivations of property and might supply a
more defensible rationale for Paul v. Davis. Id. at 701-02 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
32. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 198 n.2 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 398-99 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment); Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 226-28 (1977) (Powell, J., dissenting);
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Monaghan shared his view that due process incorporated common-law liberties with their historical encrustations intact.
Third, Justice Powell seemed untroubled by the fact that Florida law provided neither a prior hearing nor a subsequent remedy for a child who was punished through a teacher's reasonable,
good faith error. 88 He even equivocated about whether a good
faith error would "justify" an undeserved paddling as a noninfringing "correction." 84 But whether or not Monaghan would
condone this gloss on his proposal, Ingraham laid the groundwork for worse things to come.
Justice Rehnquist returned to these themes in Parratt v. Taylor, 811 another due process case involving a prisoner who had suffered a loss of personal property through the apparent negligence of prison personnel. The prison officials pitched their case
on lngraham 86 and won big. Justice Rehnquist began his analysis of this claim with what was either a passi_ng impulse of liberality or a brilliant Machiavellian move, holding that negligent
loss of property amounts to a "deprivation" within the meaning
of both section 1983 and the due process clause. 87 Repeating his
fear that upholding the claim would convert the fourteenth
amendment into "a font of tort law," 88 he invoked Bonner v.
Coughlin and Ingraham as demonstrating that the state's subsequent tort remedy satisfied its obligation to supply due process
of law. Not sharing Justice Powell's romance with the common
law, Justice Rehnquist wrote in positivist terms, distinguishing
between deprivations pursuant to "established state procedure"
and "unauthorized act[s]" of deprivation. "Unauthorized acts,"
though "under 'color of law,'" were "beyond the control of the
State. " 89 In the latter situation, a subsequent damage remedy
supplied all that due process required.
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503-06 (1977) (plurality opinion of Powell,
J.).
33. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 677 n.45 (1977); see also id. at 693-95 (White,
J., dissenting).
34. Id. at 675-78.
35. 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
36. See Petitioners' Brief on the Merits at 9-13, Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527
(1981) (No. 79-1734); Friedman, Parratt v. Taylor: Opening and Closing the Door on
Section 1983, 9 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 545, 555 (1982). The other argument made at
length, but not accepted by the Court, was that a § 1983 action cannot be predicated on
negligence. Petitioners' Brief on the Merits at 14-30.
37. Parrott, 451 U.S. at 532-35 (§ 1983), 536-37 (due process). Justice Rehnquist
sternly rejected his own argument, insisting that it would "trivialize" the Constitution,
five years later in Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330 (1986).
38. Parrott, 451 U.S. at 544 (quoting Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976)).
39. Id. at 541.

704

Journal of Law Reform

[VOL. 21:4

Like Ingraham, the Parratt opinion was Janus-faced, looking
both to the issue of when to hold the state responsible for officials' actions and to the practicability of requiring a predeprivation hearing. The opinion did not make fully clear whether his
analysis embraced only procedural, or also substantive, due process. Some concurring Justices worried that the majority opinion
read as if substantive due process did not even exist.' 0
Parratt's revisionist approach to the relationship between due
process and state postdeprivation remedies for "unauthorized"
acts has spread like wildfire through the federal courts. 41 The
Supreme Court extended its application to the intentional-and
allegedly malicious-"unauthorized" destruction of a prisoner's
property in Hudson v. Palmer. 42 Chief Justice Burger continued
the Ingraham-Parratt tradition of failing to distinguish between
the "impracticability" of a prior hearing and a holding that "the
state's action is not complete until and unless it provides or refuses to provide a suitable postdeprivation remedy." 43 This latter analysis runs violently counter to Monaghan's recommendations. As he acidly wrote in Of "Liberty" and "Property," "the
more reprehensible and subject to legal redress the conduct, the
freer the state is to engage in it.""
If Parratt is read to permit the state to disavow a state officer's misconduct as "not complete" or not the state's own action simply because the misconduct is unlawful and remediable
under state tort law, the case threatens to revolutionize well-settled aspects of the "state action" doctrine under the fourteenth
amendment. Acts by state officials; even if unlawful under state
law, have been understood as incontestably "state action" since
1913, when the Supreme Court characterized the contrary proposition as follows:
The vice which not only underlies but permeates the
proposition is not far to seek. It consists first in causing
by an artificial construction the provisions of the Four40. Id. at 545 (Blackmun, J., concurring); id. at 547 (Powell, J., concurring).
41. See Blum, Applying the Parrett/Hudson Doctrine: Defining the Scope of the Logan Established State Procedure Exception and Determining the Adequacy of State
Postdeprivation Remedies, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 695 (1986); Nahmod, Due Process,
State Remedies, and Section 1983, 34 U. KAN. L. REV. 217 (1985); Note, Parrett v. Taylor
Revisited: Defining the Adequate Remedy Requirement, 65 B.U.L. REV. 607 (1985) [hereinafter B.U. Note); Note, Due Process: Application of the Parrett Doctrine to Random
and Unauthorized Deprivation of Life and Liberty, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 887 (1984).
42. 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984).
43. Id. at 533 (emphasis added); see id. at 533 n.14 (calling result "foreshadowed" by
discussion of Ingraham in Parrott).
44. Monaghan, supra note 2, at 427.
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teenth Amendment not to reach those to whom they are
addressed when reasonably construed; and second in
wholly misconceiving the scope and operation of the
Fourteenth Amendment, thereby removing from the control of that Amendment the great body of rights which it
was intended it should safeguard and in taking out of
reach of its prohibitions the wrongs which it was the purpose of the Amendment to condemn.' 11
Some Justices have insisted that Parratt does not apply to liberty interests (as opposed to property interests) or to substantive due process (as opposed to procedural due process).'6 But
these issues remain unresolved by the Supreme Court as of this
writing, and it is hard to see why the distinctions make sense if a
state action analysis is truly involved.'7
Parratt's capacity for turning the clock back a century with
regard to the relationship between the federal government and
state officials, particularly once extended to intentional conduct,
provoked Monaghan to take up the cudgels against this line of
cases again, in a 1986 article entitled State Law Wrongs, State
Law Remedies, and the Fourteenth Amendment.'8 He identified
a number of possible strategies for limiting or refashioning Parratt, including: (1) restricting it to a procedural due process
analysis;' 9 (2) treating it as a judicially crafted abstention or exhaustion doctrine; 110 (3) limiting it to the actions of "lower echelon state employees"; 111 and (4) recharacterizing it as a construction of the conditions for liability under section 1983. 112
45. Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278, 286 (1913); see
Monaghan, State Law Wrongs, State Law Remedies, and the Fourteenth Amendment,
86 CoLUM. L. REV. 979 (1986); Note, Unauthorized Conduct of State Officials Under the
Fourteenth Amendment: Hudson v. Palmer and the Resurrection of Dead Doctrines, 85
COLUM. L. REV. 837 (1985).
46. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 336-43 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring) (exempting substantive due process but not liberty); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 541
n.4 (1984) (Stevens, Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., concurring in part) (exempting substantive due process); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 545 (1981) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring) (exempting life and liberty); id. (White, J., concurring).
47. Monaghan reads Parratt itself as rejecting a substantive due process claim,
Monaghan, supra note 45, at 985-86, but the opinion is at the very least ambiguous on
this point and surely open to reexamination in light of the doubts of the concurring
Justices, see Parratt, 451 U.S. at 545 (Blackmun, J., concurring); id. at 552-53 (Powell,
J., concurring in the result).
48. Monaghan, supra note 45.
49. Id. at 984.
50. Id. at 987-88.
51. Id. at 994 & n.98 (quoting Dwyer v. Regan, 777 F.2d 825, 832 (2d Cir. 1985)).
52. Id. at 999.
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Monaghan called for Parratt to be overruled, or at least reshaped into a nonconstitutional doctrine. We may wish him
greater success this time.

** *
Even when limited to a procedural due process doctrine turning on the "impracticability" of prior hearings, Parratt and
Hudson threaten serious damage to settled understandings.
With the reader's indulgence, I will add to Monaghan's critique
of Parratt a perspective of my own. 53 Because the Supreme
Court's Parratt cases arose as section 1983 actions, the state tort
action has been the hypothetical road not taken. Its characteristics and probable outcome have been somewhat speculative.
But suppose we consider the problem from the alternative
viewpoint: the plaintiff has been deprived of liberty or property
without a hearing by means of "random and unauthorized" official acts, has pursued a state law remedy, and has lost. Does any
federal issue remain for direct review in the Supreme Court or
for habeas corpus relief if the plaintiff remains in confinement?
The Parratt approach would suggest that the only federal issue
available is the adequacy of the state law remedy. But in that
case, what does "adequacy" mean?
In its eagerness to close the door on the section 1983 plaintiff,
the Supreme Court has put the burden on the plaintiff to
demonstrate "inadequacy" and has tended to compare the features of state tort law with those of section 1983. 54 This has led
some courts and commentators to suggest that a state law remedy may be "adequate" for Parratt purposes even if the plaintiff's loss is foreordained by defenses of sovereign immunity or
official immunity that could have been raised in a section 1983
action. 55 Yet this would permit the plaintiff to be deprived of
her liberty or property without ever having had an opportunity
53. I recognize the risk that I will thereby make this article prove its own thesis, since
pointing out absurd consequences that could flow from a legal doctrine generally has
three possible effects: (1) no effect at all (the most likely); (2) modification of the doctrine (perhaps the least likely); or (3) bringing on the absurd consequences.
54. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 535 (1984); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527,
543-44 (1981). But see Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 341-42 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (testing the adequacy of a remedy for "fundamental
unfairness").
55. See, e.g., Blum, supra note 41, at 723-25; B.U. Note, supra note 41, at 623-27,
638; see also Daniels, 474 U.S. at 341-43 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (stating that sovereign immunity does not render procedure "fundamentally unfair").
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to test the merits of her claim to it. The opportunity to be heard
required by due process is the opportunity to be heard on the
merits of the deprivation. 118 For example, the Court's precedents
upholding summary action generally do so on the ground that
exigent circumstances require swift action, and that an opportunity for a hearing on the merits unprejudiced by the prior summary determination is afforded. 117
A more appropriate standard of comparison in Parratt cases,
rather than the section 1983 procedure, is the procedure that
due process would have required if the deprivation had been authorized under state law. To the extent that the latter question
is controlled by Mathews v. Eldridge-type cost-benefit balancing, Ingraham suggests that exigencies may sometimes result in
due process being satisfied by a sufficiently trustworthy ex parte
procedure, followed only by a deferential judicial hearing, rather
than by the usual opportunity for a full airing of the merits. 118
But there is little reason to regard random and unauthorized
deprivations of liberty or property by state officials as a trustworthy ex parte procedure comparable to the authorized exercises of disciplinary judgment by public school teachers. Thus,
even a Mathews v. Eldridge analysis suggests that the "adequate" state remedy must provide a full inquiry into the merits,
unhampered by deferential standards of review or defenses of
good faith or reasonable belief. Sovereign immunity and official
immunity in particular cannot be defensive shields in the remedial action, as they would not have been available as swords in
the affirmative proceeding that the state should have brought
against the individual.
Confusion about the "adequacy" issue is especially evident in
the lower court cases that apply the Parratt analysis to "random
and unauthorized" departures from procedural regularity in the
course of a predeprivation hearing conducted under state law. 119
56. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 434-35 (1982); Memphis Light,
Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 16 n.19 (1978); Southern Ry. Co. v. Virginia, 290
U.S. 190, 199 (1933); 8. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 5.9 at 221 (2d ed. 1984)
("[W]here due process requires a hearing, it must be on the merits of the controversy.");
see also Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 581 n.10 (1975).
57. See, e.g., Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 611-12 (1974); Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594, 598-99 (1950); Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245,
253-54 (1947); see also Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589, 597-99 (1931).
58. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 677-78, 682 (1977).
59. Compare Lake Nacimiento Ranch Co. v. County of San Luis Obispo, 830 F.2d
977 (holding that Parratt bars § 1983 claim based on county supervisor's financial interest in zoning decision), amended, 841 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 79
(1988); Schaper v. City of Huntsville, 813 F.2d 709 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding that Parratt
bars § 1983 claim based on firing of police captain by biased superiors); Lee v. Hutson,
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For example, in Holloway v. Walker, the Fifth Circuit held that
a plaintiff who had allegedly been deprived of a fair trial by a
state trial court judge who was allegedly bribed could not bring
a section 1983 action because the state provided "adequate" appellate review. 60 Treating this due process deprivation as "not
complete" until the state has failed to provide an "adequate"
appellate remedy seems quite consistent with the peculiar logic
of Hudson v. Palmer. 61 But note the consequence: so long as the
state appellate remedy provides an "adequate" opportunity to
show that the trial was a mockery, the plaintiff has been afforded due process regardless of whether the appellate court correctly rules on the facts or the law concerning the trial's validity.
The only federal issue available on direct review is then the "adequacy" of the appellate procedure, not whether the trial was
fair. Applying this to the field of criminal procedure, we would
say that neither direct review nor habeas corpus will lie for "random and unauthorized" trial court improprieties so long as the
state affords "adequate" corrective process, since the only federal issue in such cases is the "adequacy" of the state's corrective process. Needless to say, this would revolutionize criminal
810 F.2d 1030 (11th Cir. 1987) (holding that Parratt bars § 1983 claim that civil service
board hearing was a sham); Holloway v. Walker, 784 F.2d 1287 (5th Cir.) (holding that
Parratt bars § 1983 claim based on alleged bribery of state court judge), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 984 (1986) and Collins v. King, 743 F.2d 248 (5th Cir. 1984) (holding that Parratt bars § 1983 claim based on participation of biased prison official in disciplinary
hearing) with Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026 (9th Cir. 1985) (en bane) (holding that
Parratt does not bar § 1983 claim based on prosecutor's conspiratorial abuse of criminal
process) and Patterson v. Coughlin, 761 F.2d 886 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that Parratt
does not bar § 1983 claim based on concededly defective prison disciplinary hearing that
also violated state rules), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1100 (1986).
60. Holloway v. Walker, 784 F.2d, 1287, 1292-93 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 984
(1986). In fact, the state courts found that the plaintiffs' effort to overturn the state trial
court judgment in federal court barred them from seeking state appellate review. Id. at
1290 (citing Humble Exploration Co. v. Browning, 690 S.W.2d 321 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985),
cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1065 (1986)).
61. 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984) ("Arguably, intentional acts are even more difficult to
anticipate because one bent on intentionally depriving a person of his property might
well take affirmative steps to avoid signalling his intent."). Some courts have tried to
distinguish between Parratt-type cases, in which state officials act unlawfully outside
any established state procedure, and cases in which state officials act unlawfully within
an established state procedure whose rules they do not follow. See Bretz v. Kelman, 773
F.2d 1026 (9th Cir. 1985) (en bane); Patterson v. Coughlin, 761 F.2d 886 (2d Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1100 (1986). The Ninth Circuit tried to justify this distinction in
terms of the language of the Parratt cases and particularly Logan v. Zimmerman Brush
Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982). But the Supreme Court's approach does not seem to support
this distinction. In Logan, the Court emphasized that "the state system itself" destroyed
the plaintiff's property, and that Logan was "challenging not the Commission's error, but
the 'established state procedure' that destroys his entitlement without according him
proper procedural safeguards." Id. at 436.
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procedure: it has been settled since 1953 that federal courts have
the power to review on habeas state appellate rulings on constitutional defects in trial procedure, regardless of the adequacy of
the state's corrective process, and the fairness of the trial was an
issue open to direct review long before that time. 62
Thus, when a lawless state official acting within an established
state procedure required by due process utterly vitiates the individual's right to a hearing, no process that fails to lead to a substitute de novo hearing can be "adequate" to afford the process
due. 63 The failed hearing is as good as no hearing at all, and the
state must provide as postdeprivation process the hearing on the
merits that due process requires.

II.

SECOND CAUTIONARY TALE: To CHEVRON, AND BACK AGAIN?

My second example implicates deeper questions about the relationship of scholarship to law, and it may be on the road to a
happier ending. It concerns a standard conundrum of administrative law: the degree of deference that a court should show to
an administrative agency in interpreting a statute that the
agency administers. Monaghan set forth his views on this question in a 1983 article with the catchy title, Marbury and the Administrative State. 64 The Supreme Court quickly took notice of
his proposal, and then, a year later, elaborated a strikingly similar position in the leading case of Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.er,
The problem of judicial deference to administrative interpretations has traditionally been analyzed under such rubrics as
"scope of review on issues of law."66 One common approach has
62. See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953). See generally Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441, 444, 48384 (1963).
63. In the criminal procedure context, the Supreme Court has held that even the
opportunity for a de novo trial as of right before an unbiased judge does not redeem a
statutory procedure that begins with a trial before a judge tainted by pecuniary interest.
Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 61-62 (1972). This makes sense from a costbenefit analysis point of view, given the ease with which the state can eliminate the
biased first tier.
64. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 CoLUM. L. REV. 1 (1983).
65. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
66. See, e.g., 4 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 30.01-.14 (1st ed. 1958)
(chapter entitled "Scope of Review of Application of Legal Concepts to Facts"); Jaffe,
Judicial Reuiew: Question of Law, 69 HARV. L. REV. 239 (1955); Section of Admin. Law,
Am. Bar Ass'n, Scope-of-Reuiew Doctrine: Restatement and Commentary, 38 ADMIN. L.
REv. 233, 236 (1986) (section entitled "Standards of Review: Issues of Law").
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called for courts to decide issues of statutory interpretation independently, without ceding any authority in the matter to administrative agencies. 67 More frequently, courts have given significant weight to administrative interpretations,68 often going so
far as to say that any reasonable interpretation by an agency of
its governing statute must be upheld. 69 From the point of view
of administrative law, the problem is either (descriptively) to explain when a court is likely to take the former attitude and when
the latter, or (prescriptively) to identify the circumstances under
which such deference is appropriate.
The administrative law of the Administrative Procedure Act
generation never settled on an accepted solution to this problem.
As Judge Friendly concluded, there were simply "two lines of
Supreme Court decisions ... which are analytically in conflict."70 When the legal scholarship of the 1970's and 1980's increasingly emphasized the play of political forces underlying the
exercise of administrative "expertise"71 and the contested enterprise of legal interpretation,72 one could reasonably expect that
new perspectives would be brought to bear on this unanswered
question.
Monaghan did not set out to provide a full account of the circumstances dictating particular degrees of deference to administrative interpretation. Unlike the complex inquiries of some of
his colleagues more deeply interested in the day-to-day workings
of administrative law,73 Monaghan's investigation focused on a
67. See, e.g., Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485, 492 (1947); Crowell v.
Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 49 (1932); 5 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 29.16, at
403-04 (2d ed. 1984); 4 K. DAVIS, supra note 66, § 30.06.
68. See, e.g., Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944); Diver, Statut~ry Interpretation in the Administrative State, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 562-63 (1985). But see 5
K. DAVIS, supra note 67, § 29.16, at 403 (claiming that the Supreme Court itself decides
independently more often than it defers).
69. See, e.g., NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111 (1944); Gray v. Powell, 314
U.S. 402 (1941); 5 K. DAVIS, supra note 67, § 29.16, at 401-02; 4 K. DAVIS, supra note 66,
§ 30.05.
70. Pittston Stevedoring Corp. v. Dellaventura, 544 F.2d 35, 49 (2d Cir. 1976), aff'd
sub nom. Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249 (1977); see also 4 K.
DAVIS, supra note 66, § 30.07.
71. See, e.g., Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV.
L. REV. 1667 (1975); Sunstein, Factions, Self-Interest and the APA: Four Lessons Since
1946, 72 VA. L. REV. 271 (1986).
72. See, e.g., Brest, Interpretation and Interest, 34 STAN. L. REV. 765 (1982); Cornell,
Institutionalization of Meaning, Recollective Imagination and the Potential for Transformative Legal Interpretation, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1135 (1988); Fiss, Objectivity and
Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739 (1982); Symposium: Law and Literature, 60 TEx. L.
REV. 373 (1982).
73. See, e.g., Mayburg v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 740 F.2d 100, 105-07
(1st Cir. 1984) (Breyer, J.); Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38
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more fundamental aspect of the problem. He posed the question
of how judicial deference to administrative interpretation could
be squared with separation of powers and with the traditional
insistence on final judicial authority in matters of legal interpretation. Thus, in accord with its title, Marbury and the Administrative State juxtaposes the Supreme Court's consistent exercise
of independent authority in constitutional interpretation with
its frequent exercise of deference to the executive branch in statutory interpretation.
Monaghan rejected the view that courts defer to administrators when the latter's "expertise" assists the judge in resolving
her uncertainty about a statute's meaning. 74 When a court states
that it is deferring to an agency in resolving a legal issue, the
court does not express uncertainty about how the statute should
be interpreted. Rather, the court interprets the statute as delegating authority to resolve the issue to the agency. Thus, deference is consistent with the notion that "[i]t is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the
law is,"711 so long as we recognize that "the law" sometimes "is"
nothing more than a delegation of authority to the executive
branch. Monaghan did not claim that this was a wholly original
insight. He generously credited earlier scholars who had seen
that the effect of deference was to create a delegation. 76 But
Monaghan went beyond these precursors in conceptualizing all
deference as an interpretive act recognizing tacit delegation as
the statute's meaning.
Monaghan never claimed that this theoretical reconceptualization of deference solved the problems of when and how much to
defer. Rather, he said, "the degree of deference that a court
should give any agency interpretation of law is properly, within
broad constitutional limits, entirely a matter of legislative intent."77 Because legislatures rarely provide much instruction in
such matters, courts may evolve presumptions concerning the
degree of deference appropriate to a given agency action in a
given statutory configuration. 78
Once more, the Supreme Court quickly picked up on
Monaghan's contribution. Marbury and the Administrative
L. REV. 363 (1986); Diver, supra note 68; Levin, Identifying Questions of Law in
Administrative Law, 74 GEO. L.J. 1 (1985).
74. See Monaghan, supra note 64, at 30 nn.176-77.
75. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
76. Monaghan, supra note 64, at 26 n.149, 27 & n.158.
77. Id. at 31 n.184.
78. Id. at 31 & nn.184-85.
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State appeared in the January 1983 issue of the Columbia Law
Review. Justice White quoted its central thesis in his June 1983
dissent in the legislative veto case, Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha. 79
Monaghan's thesis reappeared, without citation, as the core of
Justice Stevens's new approach to statutory interpretation in
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc. 80 The Chevron opinion purported to reconcile the two lines
of administrative deference cases by setting out a two-stage
analysis. In '.reviewing an agency's interpretation of a statute
committed to its care, a court should first ask "whether Congress
has directly spoken to the precise question at issue."81 The court
should conduct this inquiry independently, without any deference to the agency's views. But if the court is unable to find a
clearly expressed congressional intent, "if the statute is silent or
ambiguous with respect to the specific issue," 82 then the question has been delegated explicitly or implicitly to the agency. 83
The court must then accept any "reasonable interpretation" the
agency adopts. 84 In Chevron, the Supreme Court applied this
analysis on its way to enforcing deference to the Environmental
Protection Agency's redefinition of the term "stationary source"
as employed in the Clean Air Act. 811
The Chevron two-stage analysis has been widely recognized as
a significant innovation in administrative law and a substantial
reallocation of power from the judiciary to the executive
branch. 86 Chevron's equation between deference and delegation
adopts Monaghan's conceptualization, but its implementation
involves simplifications that Monaghan never recommended.
79. 462 U.S. 919, 986 n.19 (White, J., dissenting). "But as Henry Monaghan has observed: 'Judicial deference to agency "interpretation" of law is simply one way of recognizing a delegation of lawmaking authority to an agency.'" Id.
80. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
81. Id. at 842.
82. Id. at 843.
83. Id. at 843-44.
84. Id. at 844. It is surely a sign of the Court's estrangement from the constitutional
"nondelegation doctrine" that the Court announced unblinkingly as a general principle
what amounts to a reverse clear statement approach: the Court will always assume Congress delegated legislative power, unless Congress clearly expresses a contrary intent. See
id. at 843-44. Justice Stevens had purported to be influenced by an opposite norm, construing a statute in a manner that restricted delegation in Industrial Union Dep't v.
American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 646 (1980) (Stevens, J., plurality opinion).
85. 467 U.S. at 866.
86. See, e.g., Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 283,
283-84 (1986); Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year: Some Implications of the
Supreme Court's Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 CoLUM. L.
REv. 1093, 1119-21 (1987); Sunstein, supra note 71, at 287-88.
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First, a very controversial aspect of the Chevron methodology ·
involves the translation of all statutory ambiguity into delegation to the executive branch. The Chevron opinion is a prime
candidate for deconstruction. The text engages in an extravagant reification of an entity known as the "intent of Congress"
that must be "unambiguously expressed. " 87 At the same time,
tucked away in a footnote, we find a reaffirmation that a court
can "ascertain[]" congressional intent using "traditional tools of
statutory construction."88 Justice Stevens was later to be reminded, to his discomfort, how facilely his colleagues could manufacture ambiguity in statutory language. 89 Statutes always require interpretation; the real question is how much interpretive
authority has been delegated to the court and how much to the
agency. 90
Second, Chevron mandates a uniform test of "reasonableness"
for review of all agency interpretations. This carries even further
the opinion's insensitivity to matters of degree.
Monaghan's Marbury had been clear in emphasizing the varying degrees to which courts shared with agencies the responsibility for interpreting statutory language. "Frequently the court
will (or should) understand the statutory mandate as directing
it, not the agency, to supply all or most of the relevant meaning.
In these circumstances, the agency view is a datum, a highly relevant one, but a datum only . . . . " 91 With other statutes, "[t]he
court's task is to fix the boundaries of delegated authority, an
inquiry that includes defining the range of permissible criteria. "92 The court thus defines the zone of discretion within which
the agency may operate: "the judicial role is to specify what the
statute cannot mean, and some of what it must mean, but not all
that it does mean."93 Where Congress does not communicate the
degree of deference it expects, courts may rely on presumptive
87. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843; see also id. at 861 ("an actual intent of Congress").
Ironically, this occurs in a discussion whose very subject is interpretation, and which
cites no evidence whatsoever of congressional intent regarding norms of interpretation.
88. 467 U.S. at 843 n.9. But see, e.g., Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate
Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are To Be Construed, 3 VAND. L.
REV. 395 (1950) (pointing out existence of pairs of equal and opposite canons of
construction).
89. See Young v. Community Nutrition Inst., 476 U.S. 974, 984-88 (1986) (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
90. Monaghan, supra note 64, at 27-28.
91. Id. at 27.
92. Id.
93. Id.
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"rules tying the degree of deference to be accorded agency action to the type of agency action involved. " 94
One explanation for the crudeness of the Chevron analysis lies
in the political goal underlying the decision: reining in policymaking under the rubric of statutory interpretation by the D.C.
Circuit. 911 Just as in the Vermont Yankee case,96 which was directed at the D.C. Circuit's policy-making in the guise of policing agency procedures, 97 indignation and rhetorical momentum
may have led the Justices to overstated positions that they will
prove unable to live with. 98
Beyond that, however, the Chevron standard may have been a
"natural," though not necessary, consequence of equating deference with delegation. 99 Reconceptualizing deference as the recognition of delegation changes the way questions are asked and affects the verisimilitude of various answers. For example, it
facilitates a collapse of the distinction between administrative
interpretation of a statute and administrative adoption of "legislative" rules pursuant to an express delegation of lawmaking authority. The former is now just an "implicit" instance of the latter.100 Courts are so accustomed to applying a single, very
relaxed reasonableness standard (in a word, "arbitrary-and-capricious"101) to the review of expressly authorized rulemaking
that Chevron's all-or-nothing approach to the review of "implicitly" authorized lawmaking seems to follow naturally. 102 If defer94. Id. at 31 n.184.
95. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
841-42, 864-66 (1984). For a different interpretation of the Court's purpose, see Strauss,
supra note 86, at 1118-35 (arguing that allocation of interpretive authority to an agency
compensates for the Supreme Court's inability, given caseload pressures, to impose uniformity of interpretation on courts of appeals).
96. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.
435 U.S. 519 (1978).
97. See, e.g., id. at 524-25, 546-48, 555, 558.
98. See 5 K. DAVIS, supra note 67, § 29.17; Scalia, Vermont Yankee: The APA, the
D.C. Circuit, and the Supreme Court, 1978 SUP. CT. REV. 345, 345, 394-95 (1979); Stewart, Vermont Yankee and the Evolution of Administrative Procedure, 91 HARV. L. REV.
1805, 1816-17, 1821 (1978).
99. I would hesitate to say that the adoption of a particular conceptualization of deference necessarily entails particular consequences concerning the extent and scope of
deference. See Fish, Consequences, 11 CRITICAL INQUIRY 433, 445-47 (1985).
100. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 844 (1984).
101. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1982); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 41-45 (1983) (insisting on homogeneity of review
standard).
102. See Note, Coring the Seedless Grape: A Reinterpretation of Chevron U.S.A.
Inc. v. NRDC, 87 CoLUM. L. REV. 986,997 (1987) ("Congress either delegated interpretive
authority to the agency or it did not.").
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ence, viewed as delegation, becomes a matter of congressional
intent, then the obvious place to look for indications of degree of
deference would be where Congress virtually never puts
them-in statutory language. 103 Of course, the Court could just
as easily have imputed to Congress all the complex factors
judges had evolved before Chevron for determining the "weight"
of administrative opinion. 10• But the simplism of Chevron was
the path of least effort.
Viewing deference as the recognition of a delegation tends to
favor certain answers to other questions as well. In Chevron itself, the Court emphasized that an agency was free to change its
interpretation: "the agency, to engage in informed rulemaking,
must consider varying interpretations and the wisdom of its policy on a continuing basis." 106 When agency interpretations were
accorded "weight" because the agency's expertise gave it special
insight into what Congress meant, or because the agency's contribution to the drafting of the statute gave it insider's knowledge, the timing and consistency of the interpretation received
greater emphasis. 108
Although the delegation rationale for deference deemphasizes
traditional factors of timing and consistency, it gives new prominence to the traditional factor "thoroughness of reasoning." If
agency interpretation is delegated lawmaking, then presumably
courts ought to review the policy-based reasoning of the interpreter as thoroughly as they review notice-and-comment
rulemaking. The court should ask not only whether the agency's
interpretation is among the reasonable alternatives, but also
whether the agency acted reasonably in preferring that interpretation. 107 Chevron was decided only a year after the Supreme
103. See Diver, supra note 68, at 570.
The Executive has successfully fought off the Bumpers Amendment, which would forbid judicial deference to agency interpretations. See, e.g., Levin, supra note 73, at 2-9.
Furthermore, the language of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), directing the
reviewing court to "decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency
action," 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1982), has rarely been taken seriously.
104. See, e.g., Breyer, supra note 73, at 371-73, 379-81 (urging "less univocal, less farreaching interpretation of Chevron").
105. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
863-64 (1984).
106. See Breyer, supra note 73, at 368-71. Of course, these factors can be reemphasized within Monaghan's framework by imputing them to congressional intent, see
Monaghan, supra note 64, at 31 nn.184-85, and even within the Chevron analysis by
building them into the definition of reasonableness, see NLRB v. United Food Workers,
108 S. Ct. 413, 421 n.20 (1987).
107. See, e.g., Chevron, 467 U.S. at 858 (discussing agency's "reasons for concluding
that [its interpretation] was more appropriate"); id. at 863-65; Garland, Deregulation
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Court's ratification of the "hard look" approach to review of
rulemaking. 108 The Chenery principle109 insists that the agency
must spell out its own reasoning when its order "is valid only as
a determination of policy or judgment which the agency alone is
authorized to make." 110 The Chevron approach vastly increases
the range of issues, formerly viewed as statutory interpretation,
that are now matters of agency discretion. Looser practices developed in the days when agency opinion was a "factor" entitled
to "weight" would appear suspect after Chevron.
Similarly, it is hard to see why a court would now "defer" to
an agency's interpretation of its organic statute as not delegating
to it the power to regulate certain activity. Deferring would
mean recognizing that the choice of whether or not to regulate
that activity had been delegated to the agency. Permitting the
agency to contradict the court on that point seems inconsistent
with the delegation analysis. Rather, the agency would now have
to justify the refusal to regulate as a policy-determined exercise
of its delegated authority. The agency may base this refusal on
its understanding of technical and administrative realities and
on its regulatory philosophy, but not on its superior knowledge
of legislative history or legal precedent. m
The reconceptualization of deference tends to reopen other
problems. The Chevron framework leaves little room for accommodating "interpretive" regulations that lack binding force of
law. 112 Furthermore, the delegation analysis does not explain
how to conceptualize judicial deference to officials like the
Comptroller General, who cannot receive delegations of lawmakand Judicial Review, 98 HARV. L. REv. 505, 549-53 (1985). But see Young v. Community
Nutrition Inst., 476 U.S. 974, 981 (1986) (upholding agency interpretation on basis of
grammatical analysis and fact that it does not lead to "an absurd result").
108. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 463
U.S. 29 (1983).
109. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943).
110. Id. at 88.
.
111. See, e.g., Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. ICC, 826 F.2d 1125, 1129 (D.C. Cir.
1987); Prill v. NLRB, 755 F.2d 941, 947-48 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 948, 474
U.S. 971 (1985).
112. See Breyer, supra note 73, at 371-72; Saunders, Interpretative Rules with Legislative Effect: An Analysis and a Proposal for Public Participation, 1986 DuKE L.J. 346,
357. The fact that the APA specifically contemplates "interpretative rules" and exempts
them from notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures, 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) (1982),
makes this more than a nominal inconvenience. See Saunders, supra, at 367. Monaghan
had recognized that, under his theory, the difference between substantive and interpretive rules was one of degree, not of kind, and that notice-and-comment procedures
should apply. Monaghan, supra note 64, at 26 & nn.151-52.
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ing authority. 113 Resolving these questions may force the Court
to reintroduce considerations of degree· that Chevron had purported to banish. This may in turn destabilize the uniform "reasonableness" analysis.
Chevron also tells us nothing about how to review an agency's
interpretation of its own regulations. Construing a regulation as
the agency's delegation to itself of authority to adopt reasonable
resolutions of its own ambiguities would not only be ludicrous,
but would distract us from the practical reasons for secondguessing agency interpretations of regulations-unfair surprise
and circumvention of procedures for amending rules. 114 The
Court in Chevron encouraged agencies to revise their statutory
interpretations in order to provide flexible responses to changing
situations without the need to return to Congress for new legislation.1H The Court has not yet indicated a willingness to eviscerate the notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures of the
Administrative Procedure Act in order to maximize agency
flexibility. 118
113. Compare, e.g., Bowsher v. Merck & Co., 460 U.S. 824, 837-39 (1983) and B.K.
Instrument, Inc. v. United States, 715 F.2d 713, 729-30 (2d Cir. 1983) (Friendly, J.) (involving deference) with Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 733-34 (1986); Ameron, Inc. v.
United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 809 F.2d 979, 994-95 (3d Cir. 1986) (Becker, J.),
cert. dismissed, 109 S. Ct. 297 (1988) and Delta Data Sys. Corp. v. Webster, 744 F.2d
197, 201-03 & n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Scalia, J.) (involving nondelegation).
Moreover, understanding federal judicial deference in delegation terms should caution
against a facile transfer of federal deference practices to federal court handling of state
agency interpretations in diversity and civil rights cases. But see Huggins v. Isenbarger,
798 F.2d 203, 207-10 (7th Cir. 1986) (Easterbrook, J., concurring). The federal Constitution may not require states to employ separation of powers principles as strict as the
federal ones, but it does not inhibit them from employing stricter ones either. Traditionally, state law has been less cavalier about delegation and less deferential to agency interpretations of statutes than federal law. See, e.g., A BONFIELD, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE
RULE MAKING § 9.2.12(0 (1986); 2 F. COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 707-10 (1965);
L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 73-85, 570-71 & n.86 (1965); Brodie & Linde, State Court Review of Administrative Action: Prescribing the Scope of
Review, 1977 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 537, 546.
114. See, e.g., 4 K. DAVIS, supra note 66, § 30.12, at 261-62; Newman, How Courts
Interpret Regulations, 35 CALIF. L. REV. 509, 533-34, 536 (1947).
115. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
863-64 (1984).
116. In genuine emergencies, agencies are freed from APA notice-and-comment procedures by the APA itself, 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(B) (1982). Creative reinterpretation of existing rules might also be a device for circumventing executive review by the Office of
Management and Budget, see Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1981), reprinted in 5
U.S.C. § 601 app. at 431-34 (1982), but it is not clear that courts should play any role in
buttressing that office's subterranean procedures. See, e.g., Exec. Order, supra, at § 9
(attempting to exclude judicial review); Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal,
101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 456-62 (1987).
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Several thoughtful commentators have found Chevron, in its
standard reading, too blunt an instrument for the delicate operation of judicial review. 117 More recently, the Supreme Court has
shown signs of repentance. Justice Stevens seized an opportunity to reinterpret his Chevron opinion in Immigration and
Naturalization Service v. Cardoza-Fonseca. 118 He brought up
into text his former footnote stressing "traditional tools of statutory construction" and used it to support rejection of the Executive's views on "a pure question of statutory construction."119
Justice Scalia refused to join this opinion, emphasizing Chevron's importance in the courts of appeals and insisting that Justice Stevens now misunderstands his own opinion. 120 The outcome of this struggle is unclear-even more r~cently, Justice
Scalia and three other Justices joined in a concurring opinion
condemning lower court decisions that had viewed Cardoza. Fonseca as creating a category of "pure questions of statutory
construction" where Chevron does not automatically translate
ambiguity into delegation and deference. 121 But Monaghan's
reconceptualization nonetheless seems secure. Even without further intervention on his part, the Court may also be moving
closer to his perspective on matters of implementation.
IN PLACE OF A MORAL

Why do law review articles backfire? I think that there are
many possible reasons. The examples I have discussed here illustrate two of them.
117. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 116, at 465-69. See also Breyer, supra note 73, at
372-73; Byse, Judicial Review of Administrative Interpretation of Statutes: An Analysis
of Chevron's Step Two, 2 AnMIN. L.J. 255 (1988); Levin, Scope-of-Review Doctrine Restated: An Administrative Law Section Report, 38 AnMIN. L. REV. 239, 247 n.4, 268-69
(1986).
118. 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
119. Id. at 446; see also Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. &
Constr. Trades Council, 108 S. Ct. 1392, 1397 (1988) (holding that the Chevron approach
to statutory interpretation is trumped by the rule that statutes should be construed, if
possible, to avoid constitutional questions).
120. 480 U.S. at 453-55 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
121. NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers Local 23, 108 S. Ct. 413, 426
(1987) (Scalia, White, and O'Connor, JJ., and Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (citing as mistaken Union of Concerned Scientists v. NRC, 824 F.2d 108 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Adams
House Health Care v. Heckler, 817 F.2d 587 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. granted and judgment
vacated, 108 S. Ct. 1569 (1988); UAW v. Brock, 816 F.2d 761 (D.C. Cir. 1987)).
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Of "Liberty" and "Property" 122 backfired because the Court
seized upon an idea Monaghan had sketched briefly and in passing. Due process methodology was in flux at the time. Monaghan
wrote too allusively for his suggestion to be unambiguously identified with a particular approach to ascertaining how much process is due. His suggestion therefore lent itself too easily to a
historicist interpretation or to a forum-allocation interpretation.
Monaghan's discussion had some of the traditional failings of
obiter dicta: one could not foresee all the contexts in which the
general statement might be applied. (Of course, refraining from
obiter dicta is not even a purported norm of scholarly writing.)
The most extreme interpretation, in terms of state action, is
probably one that Monaghan would not have imagined except as
a student's blunder. 123 Thus, part of the responsibility lies with
Monaghan's article. It set out too concisely a tempting solution
to a current problem. But part of the responsibility lies also with
the unpredictable ingenuity of Chief Justice Rehnquist.
Marbury and the Administrative State 12• misfired less understandably and therefore more illuminatingly. In this article,
Monaghan had suggested a more complex model of deference as
delegation than the Court subsequently adopted. The Court
simply lifted his central reconciling conception-Justice White
in Chadha even quoted a key sentence that Monaghan had italicized-without taking along the complexities that rooted it in
existing judicial practice. Trimmed to an abstraction,
Monaghan's solution became "revolutionary" 1211 and produced a
"watershed" 126 that he had not intended to cross.
An unfortunate process of oversimplification, a kind of
Gresham's Law of legal theories, operated to produce Chevron. I
cannot say for sure where it operated, whether the subtleties
were filtered out along the path of communication from the
scholar to the Justices, 127 or whether the Justices stylized their
message to ensure its clear reception by the judges of the lower
courts. If contemporary caseload pressures leave even the Supreme Court impatient with textured analysis, then sophisti122. Monaghan, supra note 2.
123. Monaghan's seeming unawareness of Bonner v. Coughlin may have resulted
from any combination of three factors: the peripheral character of his interest, the everincreasing volume of lower court precedent, and the tendency of many elite scholars to
concentrate their attention on the Supreme Court.
124. Monaghan, supra note 64.
125. Starr, supra note 86, at 284.
126. Id. at 283.
127. Nor can I say what role law clerks may have played in the filtering process. See,
e.g., Vining, Justice, Bureaucracy, and Legal Method, 80 MICH. L. REv. 248, 252 (1981).
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cated scholarly inquiries are likely to evoke misunderstandings
like Chevron. Such events augur particularly ill for a contributory judicial role in administrative law, a subject that has long
suffered from conflicting pulls toward imposition of greater uniformity than the diversity of administrative processes will bear
and toward an unmanageable fragmentation into numerous independent subbranches.us Unless courts are going to abandon
the field altogether, they need to grapple with complexity, not
shy away from it.
If the problem lies in the Supreme Court's lack of confidence
that lower federal judges will follow less elementary directives,
then the lesson for scholarship may be less dire. Would-be law
reformers may have to devote more attention to the syntax of
the Supreme Court's dialogue with the lower courts. 129 Perhaps
with greater fluency in this language, scholars could behave
more like those poets and novelists who oppose distortion by
taking a hand in their own translation.
In either case, continued study of how articles backfire may
tell us much about both the capacities of scholarship and the
processes of more potent legal actors. After all, we usually see
things by virtue of the light that bounces off them.

128. See Elliott, The Dis-Integration of Administrative Law: A Comment on Shapiro, 92 YALE L.J. 1523 (1983); Gellhorn & Robinson, Perspectives on Administrative
Law, 75 CoLUM. L. REV. 771 (1975); see also Rabin, Administrative Law in Transition: A
Discipline in Search of an Organizing Principle, 72 Nw. U.L. REV. 120 (1977).
129. See, e.g., Cover & Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas Corpus and the
Court, 86 YALE L.J. 1035 (1977); Monaghan, The Supreme Court 1974 Term-Foreword:
Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 21-22 (1975); Nagel, The Formulaic
Constitution, 84 MICH. L. REv. 165, 178 (1985).

